(~  /     * <-^u 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  MEXICO 

1835-1837 


BY 

EUGENE  C.  BARKER 


REPRINTED  FROM  THE  MISSISSIPPI  VALLEY 
HISTORICAL  REVIEW,  VOL.  I,  JUNE,  1914 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  MEXICO,  1835-1837 

Pecuniary  claims  against  Mexico  for  losses  inflicted  on  Ameri- 
can citizens  were  a  matter  of  increasing  diplomatic  pressure 
during  the  last  two  years  of  President  Jackson 's  administration; 
and,  in  February,  1837,  the  president  asked  authority  to  use  the 
army  and  navy  in  compelling  a  settlement.  But  Congress  hesi- 
tated to  resort  at  once  to  such  radical  means;  and  the  claims, 
constantly  augmenting,  continued  to  be  an  irritating  subject  of 
negotiation  until  the  beginning  of  the  Mexican  War.  The  prin- 
cipal relations  between  the  two  countries  during  the  period  con- 
sidered in  this  paper,  however,  were  those  which  grew  out  of 
the  Texas  revolution. 

While  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  Anglo-American  colonists 
settled  Texas  with  the  intention  of  tearing  it  from  Mexico  and 
annexing  it  to  the  United  States,  they  formed  by  their  immigra- 
tion no  real  ties  with  Mexico  and  broke  none  with  the  United 
States.  A  perennial  state  of  revolution  compelled  the  govern- 
ment to  leave  them  largely  to  their  own  devices  in  local  affairs, 
and  an  unwise  suspension  of  the  tariff  in  their  favor  encouraged 
trade  with  the  United  States  instead  of  with  Mexico.  Vessels 
rarely  sailed  between  Texan  and  Mexican  ports,  though  both 
had  regular  connections  with  New  Orleans.  It  is  not  surprising, 
therefore,  that  the  Texans  turned  to  the  people  of  the  United  " 
States  for  aid  at  the  beginning  of  their  contest  with  Mexico. 

On  October  4,  two  days  after  the  outbreak  of  war,  Stephen 
F.  Austin  wrote  the  committees  of  safety  of  Nacogdoches  and 
San  Augustine,  near  the  Louisiana  frontier,  that  the  Texans 


4  E.  C.  Barker  M.  v.  H.  R. 

needed  arms  and  ammunition,  and  asked  if  guns  could  not  be 
obtained  east  of  the  Sabine.1  The  next  day  General  Houston, 
writing  at  San  Augustine,  appealed  for  volunteers  in  a  letter 
which  he  probably  intended  for  publication  in  the  papers  of  the 
United  States.  "Let  each  man  come  with  a  good  rifle  and  one 
hundred  rounds  of  ammunition, "  he  said,  "and  come  soon"; 
millions  of  acres  of  the  best  land  remained  unappropriat- 
ed, and  volunteers  would  receive  liberal  bounties.2  On  Oc- 
tober 9,  R.  R.  Royall  issued  in  the  name  of  a  central  executive 
committee  at  San  Felipe  a  general  appeal  to  the  United  States 
and  pledged  land  to  satisfy  the  "most  extravagant  expecta- 
tions. "3  On  the  twenty-sixth  Royall 's  committee,  somewhat 
enlarged,  published  an  address  explaining  the  causes  of  the 
revolution  and  pleading  for  help  from  the  people  of  the  United 
States:  "We  are  but  one  people.  Our  fathers  side  by  side 
fought  the  battles  of  the  revolution.  We  side  by  side  fought 
the  battles  of  the  war  of  1812  and  1815.  .  .  You  are  united 
to  us  by  all  the  sacred  ties  that  can  bind  one  people  to  another. 
.  .  .  We  invite  you  to  our  country  .  .  .  and  we  pledge 
to  you,  as  we  are  authorized  to  do,  the  lands  of  Texas  and  the 
honor  and  faith  of  the  people,  that  every  volunteer  in  our  cause 
shall  not  only  justly  but  generously  be  rewarded. "  *  In  No- 
vember the  newly  organized  provisional  government  .'passed 
liberal  bounty  laws  and  published  them  in  the  United  States,  and 
as  a  further  inducement  to  ambitious  volunteers  from  that 
quarter  reserved  for  them  for  a  time  a  number  of  official  posi- 
tions in  the  army.5  At  the  same  time  it  elected  three  commis- 
sioners to  the  United  States,  Stephen  F.  Austin,  B.  T.  Archer, 
and  W.  H.  Wharton,  and  instructed  them  to  negotiate  a  loan  of 
a  million  dollars,  to  fit  out  a  navy,  to  obtain  supplies  for  the 
army,  and  to  solicit  and  receive  donations.6  These  commission- 

1  Telegraph  and  Texas  Register,  October  10,  1835. 

2  New  Orleans  Courier,  October  13,  1835. 

3  Manuscript  in  Texas  State  Library. 

*Niles'  Weekly  Register,  49:  234,  235;  Texas  State  Historical  Association,  Quar- 
terly, 7:  271-273. 

s  Journal  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  General  Council  of  the  Republic  of  Texas,  at 
San  Felipe  de  Austin,  from  November  14,  1835,  to  March  1,  1836  (Houston,  1839), 
111,  117,  124. 

«  Journals  of  the  Consultation  held  at  San  Felipe  de  Austin,  October  16  to  Novem- 
ber 14,  1835  (Houston,  1838),  37.  The  commissioners  were  elected  November  12, 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  5 

ers  appointed  subcommissioners ;  and,  in  addition,  the  pro- 
visional government  made  a  practice  throughout  the  revolution 
of  creating  special  agents  of  those  whom  business  or  other  in- 
terests called  to  the  United  States.  Some  of  these  were  merely 
to  raise  volunteers,  some  carried  blank  commissions  for  priva- 
teers, and  others  were  to  purchase  and  equip  ships  of  war.7 

In  the  United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  popular  enthusiasm 
for  the  Texan  cause  was  spontaneous  and  fairly  general.  Be- 
fore the  end  of  November,  1835,  meetings  were  held  at  various 
places  in  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  Georgia,  Tennessee, 
Kentucky,  Ohio,  Pennsylvania,  and  New  York.  With  the  prog- 
ress of  the  Texan  commissioners  up  the  Mississippi-Ohio  val- 
ley in  the  spring  of  1836  and  the  reports  of  Mexican  barbarity 
at  the  Alamo  and  Goliad,  interest  still  further  quickened  and 
extended  to  the  great  cities  of  the  East  —  Washington,  Balti- 
more, Pittsburgh,  Philadelphia,  New  York,  and  Boston.8  The 
procedure  of  these  meetings  was  everywhere  the  same.  They 
assembled  in  response  to  a  public  notice  in  the  local  papers, 
adopted  resolutions  of  sympathy,  opened  a  list  for  volunteers, 
and  appointed  a  committee  to  solicit  subscriptions.  Funds  not 
consumed  in  equipping  and  transporting  the  volunteers  usually 
found  their  way  to  the  Texans  in  the  form  of  munitions  and 
supplies. 

In  credit,  loans,  and  donations  the  Texans  drew  their  finan-^X 
cial  support  almost  entirely  from  the  United  States ; 9  and  first 
and  last  they  received  several  thousand  volunteers  from  the 
same  source.    In  the  assault  on  San  Antonio  in  December,  1835, 
three  companies  from  the  United  States  —  two  from  New  Or- 

but  their  instructions  were  not  prepared  until  December  8,  and  it  was  not  until  a 
month  later  that  they  reached  New  Orleans.  See  Barker,  "Finances  of  the  Texas 
Revolution, "  in  Political  Science  Quarterly,  19:  627-631. 

7  G.  P.  Garrison,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  Republic  of  Texas  (American 
Historical  Association,  Report,  1907,  vol.  2,  1908,  vol.  2),  1:  61,  67;  Texas  State  His- 
torical Association,  Quarterly,  9 :  240,  241 ;  Journal  of  the  General  Council,  73-76. 

s  Accounts  of  these  meetings  are  found  in  the  newspapers  of  the  states  named,  in 
the  Telegraph  and  Texas  Register,  which  reprinted  the  proceedings  of  many  of  them, 
and  in  the  manuscript  materials  in  the  Austin  papers  and  the  Texas  State  Library. 
New  Orleans  papers  are  particularly  useful.  For  a  detailed  study  of  Kentucky's 
part  in  the  Texas  revolution  see  an  article  by  James  E.  Winston  in  Southwestern 
Historical  Quarterly,  16:  27-62. 

» Barker,  ' '  Finances  of  the  Texas  Revolution, ' '  in  Political  Science  Quarterly, 
19:  612-635. 


6  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v-  H-  R- 

leans  and  one  from  Mississippi10 — took  an  important  part; 
many  of  those  who  died  at  the  Alamo  were  recent i '  emigrants, ' ' 
as  were  practically  all  of  Fannin  's  command  at  Goliad  —  more 
than  four  hundred  in  number;  and  between  March  and  Decem- 
ber, 1836,  Judge  T.  J.  Chambers  alone,  who  held  a  commission 
as  major  general  from  the  provisional  government,  sent  nearly 
two  thousand  men  to  Texas.11  Austin  wrote  Governor  Smith 
in  January,  1836,  that  the  men  who  had  just  subscribed  the  first 
Texas  loans  in  New  Orleans  had  offered  to  throw  five  hundred 
men  into  Texas  within  six  weeks,  the  cost  of  this  to  be  repaid 
at  the  close  of  the  war  with  eight  per  cent  interest,  and  the 
capitalists  to  have  the  option  of  taking  land  in  repayment  at 
fifty  cents  an  acre.  Ten  days  later  he  wrote  that  the  commis- 
sioners had  authorized  Colonel  Thomas  D.  Owings,  late  of  the 
Twenty-eighth  United  States  Infantry,  to  raise  fifteen  hundred 
volunteers  and  have  them  in  Texas  by  March,  the  expense  of 
arming,  equipping,  and  transporting  them  to  be  paid  by  Texas 
at  the  close  of  the  war.12  In  March  S.  M.  Williams  wrote  that 
with  $30,000  he  could  send  three  thousand  men  to  Texas  in 
forty  days.13  About  the  same  time  General  T.  J.  Green  wrote 
that  he  was  arranging  to  raise  $50,000,  with  which  he  expected 
in  a  short  time  to  take  fifteen  hundred  men  to  Texas;  that  he 
had  appointed  many  influential  officers  in  Tennessee,  and  was 
himself  awaiting  in  New  Orleans  the  return  of  a  thousand  volun- 
teers from  the  Seminole  War,  many  of  whom  he  hoped  to  enlist 
for  Texas.  Mexico's  treatment  of  Texas,  he  said,  was  making 
the  United  States  indignant  from  New  Orleans  to  the  falls  of  the 
Ohio;  with  ample  means  he  could  within  sixty  days  send  to 
Texas  enough  men  to  "take  the  prairie  with  our  enemy"  and, 
if  necessary,  follow  him  home.14  April  18,  George  C.  Childress 
wrote  President  Burnet  that  the  South  and  West  were  "kindling 
to  a  blaze "  on  the  subject  of  Texas;  General  Richard  G.  Dun- 
lap  of  the  Tennessee  volunteers  was  anxious  to  raise  a  force 
of  from  two  to  five  thousand  men  for  Texas,  provided  he  could 
retain  there  the  same  rank  which  he  held  in  Tennessee,  and  pro- 

10  Texas  State  Historical  Association,  Quarterly,  9:   213. 

ai  Hid.,  240,  241. 

12  Garrison,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  Texas,  1 :  55-61. 

is  Williams  to  Fannin,  March  27,  1836,  manuscript  in  Texas  State  Library. 

i*  Green  to  Burnet,  April  8,  1836,  manuscript  in  Texas  State  Library. 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  7 

vided  Texas  would  furnish  transportation.  Childress  had  no 
doubt  of  his  ability  to  get  the  men  and  authorized  him  to  pro- 
ceed.15 He  hoped  to  carry  with  him  the  whole  force  of  Tennes- 
see volunteers  which  would  be  mustered  out  of  the  Florida  serv- 
ice in  June.  Before  he  made  any  progress  in  this  plan,  how- 
ever, Governor  Cannon  received  a  call  from  General  Gaines  for 
a  brigade  to  help  defend  the  southwestern  frontier;  and  Dun- 
lap  enlisted  "with  a  full  Conviction, "  as  he  explained,  "that 
we  would  not  be  detained  long  in  the  service  of  the  U.  Sts,  and 
that  in  that  event  I  could  take  the  whole  volunteer  Corps  with 
me  to  Texas. " 16  In  April,  the  papers  made  much  of  the  de- 
parture of  Captain  John  A.  Quitman  from  Natchez  with  twen- 
ty-five or  thirty  '  *  armed  emigrants, ' '  fifteen  of  whom  were  said 
to  be  members  of  his  old  company,  the  Natchez  Fencibles.17 
General  Felix  Huston  published  his  intention  to  leave  the  same 
place  early  in  May  with  several  hundred  companions.18 

The  greatest  interest  in  the  cause  of  Texas  was  manifested 
in  the  Mississippi  Valley  south  of  the  Ohio ;  and  every  state  in 
that  section  contributed  liberally  in  men  and  money ;  but  organ- 
ized companies  went  also  from  Ohio  and  New  York,19  and  others 
offered  themselves  from  Indiana,  western  Virginia,  and  Penn- 
sylvania,20 while  individuals  went  from  nearly  every  state  in 
the  Union. 

The  motives  of  most  of  these  men  seem  fairly  obvious.  The 
people  of  the  United  States  have  always  had  a  hunger  for  own- 
ing land,  but  at  this  time  that  hunger  became  greed.  In  1835, 
the  government  sales  were  nearly  twelve  million  acres;  and,  in 

IB  Garrison,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  Texas,  1 :  84-86.  Childress  with  G. 
M.  Collinsworth  had  been  commissioned  by  President  Burnet  to  take  the  place  of 
Austin,  Archer,  and  Wharton  in  the  United  States.  Their  ultimate  mission  was  to 
try  to  get  the  United  States  to  recognize  the  Texan  government. 

is  Ibid.,  94,  97.  As  will  later  appear,  General  Gaines  withdrew  his  call  before 
this  force  got  into  service. 

IT  New  Orleans  Commercial  Bulletin,  April  13,  1836,  from  Mississippi  Free  Trader. 

is  The  Mississippian  (Jackson),  April  29,  1836. 

i»  Vallette  to  Burnet,  May  31,  1836,  manuscript  in  Texas  State  Library;  New 
York  Daily  Advertiser,  November  23,  1836. 

20  Columbus  [Ohio]  Monitor,  September  26,  1836;  Vallette  to  Burnet  as  cited 
above;  Schuler  et  al.  to  Austin,  November  19,  1835,  and  Steedman  to  Smith,  Decem- 
ber 30,  1835,  manuscripts  in  Texas  State  Library.  Vallette  wrote  Burnet  that  two 
hundred  men  from  the  Kanawha  region  of  Virginia  were  expected  at  Cincinnati  early 
in  June,  and  that  the  Texas  committee  of  Cincinnati  would  provide  them  with  arms. 


8  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v-  H-  R- 

1836,  they  exceeded  nineteen  million;  but  the  government  now 
sold  only  for  cash  at  $1.25  an  acre ;  and  even  the  easy  loans  of 
the  "pet  banks "  were  beyond  the  reach  of  many  who  thus  saw 
themselves  deprived  of  a  future  competency  for  want  of  a  trif- 
ling sum.  To  these  the  Texan  bounty  laws  opened  the  door  of 
opportunity.21  Transportation  was  furnished  free,  the  Mex- 
icans were  poor  creatures  who  would  not  fight,  the  war  would 
soon  be  over,  and  every  soldier  would  find  himself  at  the  end 
possessed  of  a  princely  grant  of  the  finest  land  in  the  world.22 
Moreover,  it  was  an  age  when  men  talked  ardently  of  liberty, 
democracy,  and  the  Constitution,  and  felt  as  they  talked.  Amer- 
icans had  not  been  indifferent  to  the  heroic  deeds  of  Bolivar  or 
to  the  struggles  of  the  Greeks  and  the  Poles ;  should  they  be 
less  concerned  when  their  own  kinsmen  and  fellow  countrymen, 
"  lured "  to  Texas  by  fair  promises  and  the  guarantees  of  re- 
publican government,  were  contending  at  their  very  doors 
against  despotism  which  no  "American  born  citizen  could 
bear?"  2S  With  a  sense  of  humor  and  a  knowledge  of  the  facts, 
we  may  smile  at  the  idea  of  Mexico 's  luring  colonists  to  Texas ; 
but  a  study  of  the  public  meetings  of  1835  and  1836  will  convince 
students  that  it  expressed  the  sober  conviction  of  a  large  portion 
of  the  American  people.  The  newspapers  were  important 
agencies  in  stimulating  interest.  They  were  almost  uniformly 
friendly  to  Texas,  and  did  much  to  shape  the  public  opinion 
which  they  reflected.  The  Mexican  charge  d'affaires  at  Phila- 
delphia, Castillo  y  Lanzas,  was  quick  to  realize  this,  and  sug- 
gested to  his  government  that  it  should  subsidize  some  of  the 
more  influential  papers  to  suppress  anti-Mexican  articles  and 
publish  favorable  matter.24  Nothing  favorable  to  Mexico  had 
ever  been  printed  in  these  papers  in  the  past,  he  said,  except 
at  the  price  of  money  or  fair  words ;  and  at  present  the  former 

21  See,  for  example,  Texas  State  Historical  Association,  Quarterly,  9 :   171,  182. 

22  See,  for  example,  proceedings  of  public  meetings  at  Nashville,  Tennessee,  and 
Greensborough,  Alabama,  in  Telegraph  and  Texas  Register,  February  20,  1836,  and 
El  Correo  Atlantico  (New  Orleans),  April  18,  1836. 

2s  Proceedings  of  a  meeting  at  Mobile,  October  19,  1835,  manuscript  in  Texas 
State  Library.  This  is  typical  of  the  tone  of  many  speeches  and  resolutions.  See 
also  proceedings  of  a  meeting  in  Tammany  Hall,  November  12,  1835.  New  York 
Daily  Advertiser,  November  13,  1835. 

2*"Pagar  bien  a  los  editores  que  se  prestasen  a  sostener  nuestro  credito  y  jus- 
trcia.' 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  9 

was  indispensable,  the  best  of  promises  having  lost  their  virtue. 
His  experience  with  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer  had 
proved  the  efficacy  of  this  method.  During  a  visit  to  New  York 
in  August  he  had  talked  at  length  with  one  of  the  editors,  and 
since  then  its  language  had  changed.  The  government  ap- 
proved the  suggestion  and  sent  Castillo  a  thousand  dollars  to 
use  with  the  papers  which  had  most  distinguished  themselves 
by  their  attacks  on  Mexico,  admonishing  him  at  the  same  time 
to  "move  with  circumspection,  so  as  not  to  compromit  the  na- 
tional decorum. ' ' 25  Land  speculators  may  have  been  at  the  bot- 
tom of  some  of  the  enthusiasm  displayed  for  the  Texan  cause, 
but  their  influence  can  hardly  be  established.26  Of  a  conscious 
purpose  to  aid  the  Texans  in  order  to  bring  more  slavery  ter- 
ritory into  the  United  States,  the  writer  has  found  no  evi- 
dence.27 

All  these  pro-Texas  activities  were  carried  on  with  the  utmost 
publicity.  Meetings  were  called  by  newspaper  notices,  their 
proceedings  were  fully  reported  and  widely  copied,  committees 
used  the  press  to  urge  contributions  to  the  Texan  cause,  and 
advertisements  for  volunteers  were  common.28  With  equal  lack 

25  Castillo  to  secretary  of  relaciones,  October  2,  1835,  and  answer  of  the  secretary, 
November  5,  1835,  transcripts  of  University  of  Texas  from  Mexican  foreign  office.     I 
have  not  had  an  opportunity  to  verify  Castillo's  statement  that  the  tone  of  the  En- 
quirer changed  in  August.     It  certainly  was  hostile  to  Texas  after  that  time. 

26  The  New  York  Daily  Advertiser  in  the  issue  of  November  14,  1835,  comments 
editorially  on  the  meetings  of  Texan  sympathisers  in   New  York,  and  wonders  how 
much  enthusiasm  is  due  to  disinterested  love  of  liberty  and  how  much  to  speculation 
in  Texas  land.     From  the  list  of  names  most  active  in  the  movement,  it  suspects  that 
the  latter  consideration  cuts  some  figure.     James  Gordon  Bennett  in  the  New  York 
Herald   (April  2,  1836)  says  that  he  is  heart  and  soul  for  the  true  Texan  cause  but 
dead  against  the  speculator.     The  New  Orleans  Commercial  Bulletin   (November  21, 
1835),  however,  indignantly  denied  the  charge  of  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer 
(October  31)  that  the  Texas  committee  in  New  Orleans  was  "a  sort  of  Wall  Street 
Stock-jobbing  company ":     "the  majority     .     .     .     are  not  interested  in  a  rood  of 
ground  in  Texas  and  are  not  even  in  the  remotest  manner  connected  with  any  specu- 
lation in  that  section." 

27  The  only  reference  to  the  subject  that  I  have  noticed  is  in  The  Mississippian 
(Jackson)  of  March  18,  1836.     A  writer  there,  in  reviewing  a  pamphlet  by  Wharton 
on  the  causes  of  the  Texan  revolution,  points  out  that  the  possession  of  Texas  by  the 
United  States  would  open  an  immense  region  for  the  diffusing  of  slaves  in  which  the 
older  slave  states  could  dispose  of  their  surplus  to  advantage. 

28  For  a  typical  notice  see  the  Columbus,  Mississippi,  Southern  Argus   (December 
4,  1835)  :     "Texas  Volunteers! ! !     All  such  as  are  willing  to  risk  their  life  and  for- 


10  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v-  H-  R- 

of  concealment  the  papers  chronicled  the  movements  of  volun- 
teers already  on  the  way. 

It  required  no  gift  of  prophecy  to  foresee  that  the  Texans 
would  expect  to  draw  much  of  their  support  from  the  people 
of  the  United  States,  although,  at  the  very  outset  of  the  revo- 
lution, our  government  gave  Mexico  formal  notice  of  its  de- 
termination to  observe  scrupulous  neutrality.  On  October  21, 
1835,  Henry  Carleton,  the  United  States  district  attorney  at  New 
Orleans,  wrote  the  secretary  of  state  that  he  had  no  doubt  that 
persons  in  his  district  intended  going  to  Texas  "to  act  in  con- 
cert with  the  Texans, "  but  that  it  was  difficult  to  bring  them 
within  the  scope  of  the  law  of  April  20,  1818,  "for  it  does  not 
appear  that  any  regular  enlisting  or  entering  as  soldiers  has 
taken  place  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  or  that  any 
definite  or  tangible  military  expedition  or  enterprise  has  been 
set  on  foot  or  begun/'20  He  had  expressed  to  Pizarro  Mar- 
tinez, the  local  Mexican  consul,  his  willingness  to  prosecute 
such  offenses  against  the  Mexican  government  and  had  asked 
him  to  assist  in  finding  evidence  against  those  who  violated  the 
law,  but  Martinez  "seemed  to  think  his  agency  would  be  un- 
availing, and  said  he  could  do  nothing  more  than  communicate 
the  facts,  as  they  occurred,  to  the  officers  of  his  Government. ' ' 30 
Before  receiving  this  letter,  Forsyth  wrote  Carleton  (October 
27)  that  it  was  the  president's  fixed  determination  to  discharge 
all  the  obligations  of  the  government  and  especially  that  one 
which  "requires  that  we  shall  abstain,  under  every  temptation, 

tune  for  the  cause  of  LIBERTY  in  Texas  are  requested  to  come  forward  and  register 
their  names.  A  list  may  be  found  in  the  hands  of  the  editor  of  the  Argus. ; ' 

29  Certain  provisions  of  the  law  made  it  a  misdemeanor,  punishable  by  fine  and 
imprisonment:  (1)  for  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  to  accept  and  exercise  a  com- 
mission to  serve  any  foreign  power  against  another  power  with  which  the  United 
States  was  at  peace;  (2)  for  any  person  to  enlist  or  cause  another  to  enlist  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  or  to  cause  another  to  go  beyond  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  United  States  with  intent  to  be  enlisted;  (3)  for  any  person  ''within  the  ter- 
ritory or  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  [to]  begin  or  set  on  foot,  or  provide,  or 
prepare  the  means  for,  any  military  expedition  or  enterprise  to  be  carried  on  from 
thence  against  the  territory  of  any  foreign  prince  or  state,"  etc.;  (4)  for  any  person 
to  fit  out  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  a  vessel  for  war  against  a  power 
with  which  the  United  States  was  at  peace.  Statutes  at  Large,  3 :  447-450. 

*o  25  CTopgress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  74,  p.  3 ;  Martinez  to 
secretary  of  reladones,  November  14,  1835,  University  of  Texas  transcripts  from 
Mexican  foreign  office. 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  11 

from  intermeddling  with  the  domestic  disputes  of  other  na- 
tions ";  he  would,  therefore,  prosecute  "without  discrimina- 
tion "  all  violations  of  the  neutrality  laws  of  the  United  States. 
At  the  same  time  the  secretary  wrote  Governor  White  of  Lou- 
isiana, asking  him  to  cooperate  with  the  federal  authorities  in 
preventing  violation  of  the  law.31  And  on  November  4,  he  out- 
lined very  clearly  to  the  Mexican  charge  d'affaires  the  policy 
that  this  government  would  pursue.  The  president  wished 
Mexico  to  know,  said  Forsyth,  that  the  United  States  viewed 
the  contest  with  Texas  as  a  purely  domestic  struggle,  in  which 
the  United  States  should  maintain  absolute  neutrality ;  the  presi- 
dent would  not  depart  one  jot  from  this  policy,  and  had  already 
determined  to  instruct  the  proper  officials  to  that  effect;  but  in 
this  connection  it  was  indispensable  for  Mexico  to  understand 
that  the  United  States  government  could  not  prevent  public 
meetings  from  voting  to  collect  money,  arms,  and  men  to  aid 
the  Texans,  nor  could  it  prevent  merchant  vessels  sailing  from 
its  ports  to  Texas  with  contraband  of  war;  there  would  prob- 
ably be  a  good  deal  of  such  trade,  with  both  Mexico  and  Texas, 
but  whether  the  cargo  were  money,  arms,  or  men,  it  was  the 
task  of  Mexico,  or  of  Texas,  as  the  case  might  be,  to  prevent 
the  vessels  from  landing,  and  not  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
to  prevent  them  from  sailing.32  The  same  day  Forsyth  sent 
instructions  similar  to  those  already  given  Carleton  to  the  fed- 
eral attorneys  at  Boston,  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore, 
Mobile,  and  St.  Martinsville,  Louisiana ; 33  and,  on  November  9, 
he  instructed  Butler  to  make  at  Mexico  substantially  the  same 
statement  concerning  our  policy  that  he  himself  had  already 
made  to  Castillo.34 

The  limitation  of  the  government  by  the  Constitution  and  the 
law  of  April  20,  1818,  was  a  fact,  however,  which  Mexicans,  with 
their  own  political  background  of  arbitrary  government  and 
capricious  judicial  procedure,  were  unable  to  understand;  and, 
seeing  our  government  inactive  in  the  face  of  what  appeared  to 
them  palpable  breaches  of  neutrality,  they  felt  that  they  had 

si  25  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  74,  pp.  3,  4. 
»2  Castillo  to  secretary  of  relaciones,  November  14,  1835,  University  of  Texas  tran- 
scripts from  Mexican  foreign  office. 

83  24  Congress,  1  Session,  House  Executive  Document  256,  p.  36. 
a*  Ibid.,  3. 


12  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v-  H-  R- 

sufficient  reason  to  doubt  its  sincerity.  It  is  not  necessary  here 
to  examine  all  the  correspondence  of  the  state  department  on 
this  subject ;  a  few  passages  will  illustrate  its  tone  and  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  department.  On  October  29,  Castillo  wrote  For- 
syth  that  vessels  were  commonly  leaving  New  York  and  New 
Orleans  laden  with  arms  and  munitions  for  the  colonists;  and 
he  hoped,  for  the  sake  of  peace  and  harmony  between  his  nation 
and  the  United  States,  that  the  president,  in  his  "inflexible  rec- 
titude, ' '  would  take  measure  to  put  an  end  to  such;  proceedings. 
Forsyth  replied  that  instructions  had  been  issued  to  the  dis- 
trict attorneys  at  those  places  to  prosecute  all  violators  of  the 
law;  and  both  attorneys  soon  had  occasion  to  attempt  to  carry 
out  the  instructions.  In  New  York,  the  Mexican  vice  consul 
called  attention  to  a  meeting  at  the  Shakespeare  Hotel  on  No- 
vember 7  which  adopted  resolutions  and  appointed  a  committee 
"to  solicit  and  receive  subscriptions  for  the  benefit  of  the  Tex- 
onians."  Attorney  William  Price  put  the  matter  before  the 
federal  grand  jury,  which  was  in  session,  and  that  body  applied 
to  the  court  for  an  interpretation  of  the  law.  Confining  itself 
strictly  to  the  question  as  phrased,  the  court  ruled  that  dona- 
tions to  the  Texans  "to  enable  them  to  engage  in  a  civil  war 
with  the  sovereignty  of  Mexico"  were  not  a  "beginning,  or 
setting  on  foot,  or  providing  the  means  for,  a  military  expedi- 
tion from  the  United  States,"  and  were  therefore  not  a  viola- 
tion of  the  law.  In  December  the  rumor  spread  in  New  Orleans 
that  the  schooner  Brutus  was  being  armed  for  the  purpose  of 
capturing  vessels  in  the  Mexican  trade ;  and  a  number  of  mer- 
chants and  insurance  companies  requested  Carleton  to  prevent 
its  sailing.  He  began  proceedings  and  examined  many  witness- 
es, including  those  who  made  the  complaint,  but  failed  abso- 
lutely to  make  a  case,  though  the  Brutus  was  in  fact  fitting  out 
as  a  Texan  man  of  war.35  On  April  4,  Gorostiza,  the  Mexican 
envoy  extraordinary,  brought  to  Forsyth 's  notice  newspaper 
reports  that  the  ladies  of  Nashville  were  raising  a  company  at 
their  expense,  as  well  as  a  printed  letter  from  General  Felix 
Huston,  dated  Natchez,  March  4,  1836,  saying  that  he  expected 
to  take  five  hundred  emigrants  to  Texas  about  the  first  of  May 

ss  24  Congress,  1  Session,  House  Executive  Document  256,  pp.  8,  29 ;  25  Congress, 
2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  74,  pp.  4-21. 


vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  13 

and  that  he  was  making  arrangements  for  arms,  ammunition, 
and  uniforms' at  a  cost  of  $40,000.  An  editorial  in  the  paper 
which  printed  this  letter  advised  its  readers  that,  if  they  desired 
to  go  to  Texas  "to  aid  in  the  struggle  for  independence/'  they 
could  not  go  under  a  more  accomplished  leader.  Gorostiza  ex- 
pressed the  hope  that  the  state  department  might  block  this 
plan.  Forsyth,  as  usual,  issued  formal  instructions  to  the  dis- 
trict attorneys  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  to  prosecute  General 
Huston  or  any  one  else  who  violated  the  law;  but  the  reply  of 
one  of  these  attorneys  was  that  he  knew  of  no  persons  in  Ken- 
tucky "so  deporting  themselves  as  to  come  within  the  provisions 
of  the  act  of  Congress ' ' ;  and  another  said  that,  while  he  had  no 
doubt  that  a  movement  of  some  description  was  preparing  for 
the  assistance  of  the  Texans,  he  was  "unable  to  obtain  any 
legal  evidence  of  a  violation  of  the  laws,  on  which  to  base  a 
prosecution. "  Again,  on  July  21,  Gorostiza  inclosed  extracts 
from  the  Grand  Gulf  [Mississippi]  Advertiser  saying  that  Colo- 
nel Wilson  had  recently  passed  there  with  more  than  two  hun- 
dred men  bound  for  Texas,  "drums  beating  and  fifes  playing,7' 
and  that  three  hundred  others  were  following  from  "old  Ken- 
tucky. "  This  and  other  evidence  which  he  mentioned  caused 
him  to  believe  that  "some  agents  of  the  Federal  Government 
in  the  States"  were  not  obeying  the  president's  instructions. 
The  acting  secretary  of  state  replied  that  the  facts  would  be 
investigated  and  violations  of  the  law  punished,  and  would  Mr. 
Gorostiza  please  inform  the  department  of  any  specific  derelic- 
tion on  the  part  of  federal  officers.36 

It  is  difficult  not  to  sympathise  with  Gorostiza 's  exasperation. 
The  law  of  April  20,  1818,  lent  itself  to  easy  evasion,  and  volun- 
teers were  coached  in  all  its  loop-holes,  being  especially  warned 
that  they  must  go  to  Texas  in  their  individual  capacity.  An 
editorial  in  the  New  Orleans  Commercial  Bulletin  (November 
25,  1835)  declared  that  the  law  did  not  "mean  to  prevent  any 
citizen  from  taking  passage  in  any  merchant  vessel,  to  go  any- 
where and  with  any  intent,  and  with  arms  and  munitions  of 
war";  and  sooner  or  later  this  was  repeated  in  substance  by 

3824  Congress,  1  Session,  House  Executive  Document  256,  pp.  13,  30;  25  Congress, 
2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  74,  p.  23;  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate  Docu- 
ment I,  pp.  40,  41. 


14  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v-  H-  R- 

most  of  the  newspapers  and  most  of  the  public  meetings  of  the 
period.  A  particularly  bald  statement  of  the  subterfuge  ap- 
pears in  the  Mississippi  Free  Trader  (April  8,  1836)  in  a  "  word 
of  advice  to  those  who  intend  going  to  Texas  with  General 
Huston  and  Captain  Quitman."  "Be  cautious  in  conversa- 
tion, "  said  the  editor,  "not  to  use  any  language  which  would 
justify  an  arrest  in  the  United  States.  That  men  have  a  right 
to  travel  together  there  can  be  no  doubt.  And  further,  no  one 
who  joins  General  Huston  on  the  21st  is  bound  to  engage  in  the 
Texian  war.  Nor  do  they  make  any  engagement  to  do  so. 
General  Huston,  it  is  true,  has  some  odd  notions  of  his  own,  and 
does  not  wish  any  one  to  travel  to  Texas  with  him  who  does  not 
have  a  good  horse,  rifle  or  musket,  and  brace  of  pistols  .  .  . 
but  that  is  nobody's  business. "  District  Attorney  Sanders 
of  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  wrote  the  state  department  concern- 
ing Colonel  Wilson's  movements,  of  which  Gorostiza  had  com- 
plained on  July  21,  that  he  was  personally  acquainted  with  Wil- 
son and  had  talked  with  him  and  some  of  his  fellow-emigrants 
and  they  told  him  that  their  motive  in  going  to  Texas  was  ' '  emi- 
gration only."  "There  was  no  apparent  movement  by  Colonel 
Wilson  or  his  associates  within  my  knowledge,  exhibiting  them 
as  an  armed  force,  or  in  a  position  to  authorize  the  inference  of 
their  certain  intent  to  violate  the  neutral  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  any  foreign  Power.  Nor  did  I  perceive  or  did  any 
information  come  to  my  knowledge  upon  which  I  could  justly 
institute  any  legal  proceeding  against  them."37  Another  at- 
torney for  the  Nashville  district  is  said  to  have  declared  that 
he  would  accompany  his  men  to  the  border  to  see  that  they  did 
not  violate  the  law  in  the  United  States ;  and,  if  they  chose  to 
step  over  the  line  as  peaceable  emigrants,  they  would  then  be 
beyond  his  jurisdiction.38 

Whether  a  greater  exhibition  of  zeal  on  the  part  of  the  ad- 
ministration would  have  stimulated  local  officers  into  more  ef- 
fective efforts  is  doubtful.  Public  opinion  was  such  that  con- 
victions in  a  jury  trial  would  have  been  almost  impossible.  We 

«7  Sanders  to  Dickens,  August  5,  1836.  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate  Document 
1,  pp.  53,  54. 

88  Carson  to  Burnet,  June  1,  1836,  Garrison,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  Texas, 
1:  92. 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  15 

have  already  seen  the  attitude  of  the  grand  jury  and  the  court 
in  New  York,  and  the  failure  of  Carleton  to  obtain  evidence 
against  the  Brutus  in  New  Orleans.39  In  March,  Carleton  in- 
stituted proceedings  against  William  Christy  for  aiding  Gen- 
eral Jose  Antonio  Mexia  in  fitting  out  a  filibustering  expedi- 
tion against  Mexico.  The  facts  alleged  were  substantially  true. 
Christy  was  chairman  of  the  Texas  committee  in  New  Orleans, 
was  in  close  touch  with  Mexia,  and  undoubtedly  assisted  him  in 
organizing  his  expedition ; 40  yet  in  the  trial,  lasting  five  days, 
which  curiously  enough  was  conducted  by  Judge  Rawle  of  the 
city  court  at  the  request  of  the  federal  judge,  there  was  found  no 
evidence  to  sustain  the  charge.  The  testimony  showed  that 
Christy  had  declined  to  assist  Mexia  and  that  his  "  language 
.  .  .  was  to  dissuade  persons  from  any  enterprise  to  Texas, 
and  from  joining  Mexia 's  expedition/'41  Mexia  had  returned 
to  New  Orleans  after  the  failure  of  his  expedition ; 42  and,  on 
May  16,  the  grand  jury  found  an  indictment  against  him,  but 
the  case  seems  never  to  have  come  to  trial.43 

In  his  conference  with  Castillo  on  November  4,  1835,  Forsyth 
brought  up  a  subject  of  some  importance  in  connection  with  the 
subsequent  occupation  of  Nacogdoches  by  United  States  troops. 
The  treaty  of  1828  had  described  the  Louisiana-Texas  bound- 
ary as  beginning  ' '  at  the  mouth  of  the  river  Sabine,  in  the  sea, 
continuing  north  along  the  western  bank  of  that  river  to  the 
thirty-second  degree  of  latitude, "  etc.;  but  the  commission  for 
which  the  treaty  provided  had  never  met  to  mark  this  boundary. 
The  United  States  —  absolutely  without  ground  —  set  up  the 

39  See  ante,  12. 

40  <  <  The   [New  Orleans]   committee  informs  us  that     ...     a  vessel   well  fur- 
nished and  manned,  by  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  efficient  emigrants,  would  sail 
about  the  27th  ultimo  [October]  for  Tampico,  under  the  command  of  General  Mexia." 
(Journal  of  the  Consultation,  24.)     On  November  4,  Christy  wrote  the  provisional 
government  of  Texas :     ' '  The  contemplated  expedition  to  be  commanded  by  General 
Mexia,  consisting  of  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  will  sail  tomorrow  on  board 
the  schooner  Mary  Jane,  all  well  armed  and  provisioned:     Tampico  is  the  place  of 
destination,  which  place  we  have  no  doubt  will  be  in  the  possession  of  the  General 
in  a  few  days. ' '     Manuscript  in  Texas  State  Library. 

«  2.5  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  74,  pp.  21-23. 

42  For  an  account  of  this  movement  see  ' '  The  Tampico  Expedition, ' '  by  the  writer 
in  Texas  State  Historical  Association,  Quarterly,  6:  169-186. 

«  The  indictment  is  no.  3797,  United  States  District  Court,  Eastern  District  of 
Louisiana. 


16  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v-  H.  B. 

claim  in  1829  that  the  Neches  River,  which  flows  into  Sabine 
Lake  west  of  Sabine  Eiver,  was  the  line  intended  by  the  treaty ; 
and  Forsyth  now  suggested  that,  since  the  territory  between  the 
two  rivers  was  in  dispute,  the  best  way  to  avoid  trouble  there 
was  for  Mexico  to  give  "very  positive  and  definite "  \rnuy 
fuertes  y  terminantes]  orders  that  in  no  manner  and  under  no 
pretext  whatever  shall  Mexican  troops  advance  to  that  point 
[hasta  alia]:4*  Castillo  seems  not  to  have  discussed  the  matter 
at  the  time;  but,  when  President  Jackson  stated  in  his  annual 
message  of  December  7  that  Mexico  had  been  notified  that  "we 
should  require  the  integrity  of  our  territory  to  be  scrupulously 
respected, "  45  he  asked  whether  the  president  perchance  intend- 
ed "to  convey  the  idea  that  he  recognizes  limits  which  are  not 
those  expressly  determined  in  the  second  article  of  the  treaty." 
Forsyth  replied,  in  accordance  with  the  newly  developed  doc- 
trine of  Jackson 's  administration,  that  remarks  made  by  the 
president  in  a  message  to  Congress  were  not  considered  a  prop- 
er subject  for  diplomatic  explanations ; 46  and  there  the  subject 
rested  until  it  was  again  brought  forward  by  General  Gaines 's 
movements  on  the  frontier. 

A  letter  of  January  22,  1836,  from  the  adjutant  general  warn- 
ed General  Gaines  that  conditions  west  of  the  Mississippi  might 
soon  claim  his  attention ;  and  the  next  day  a  formal  order  from 
the  secretary  of  war  instructed  him  to  proceed  to  the  south- 
western frontier  and  assume  personal  command  of  the  troops 
to  be  employed  in  that  quarter.  The  revolution  then  going  on 
in  Texas  made  this  a  position  for  the  exercise  of  great  discre- 
tion  and  experience,  because  it  was  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
to  remain  entirely  neutral  and  to  cause  its  neutrality  to  be  re- 
spected by  others.  On  the  one  hand  Gaines  would  see  to  it  that 
neither  of  the  belligerents  crossed  the  national  boundary  in 
arms,  and  on  the  other  that  Indians  from  the  United  States  did 
not  invade  Texas.47  The  first  of  these  letters  General  Gaines 
received  at  Pensacola  Bay  on  February  6,  and  replied  that  plans 

44  Castillo   to  secretary  of  relaciones,   November   10,  1835,  University  of  Texas 
transcripts  from  Mexican  foreign  office. 

45  Bichardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  3 :   151. 

46  24  Congress,  1  Session,  House  Executive  Document  256,  pp.  12,  29. 

4725  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  351,  p.  765;  24  Congress,  1 
Session,  House  Executive  Document  256,  pp.  40-42. 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  17 

already  in  execution  for  cooperating  with  General  Clinch  in  the 
Seminole  War  made  it  inadvisable  for  him  to  move  westward 
unless  the  government,  with  a  full  knowledge  of  those  plans, 
ordered  Mm  to  do  so.48  Cass  's  order  of  the  twenty-third  reached 
him  at  New  Orleans  on  March  28,  and  he  then  immediately  set 
out  for  the  frontier.  Prom  Baton  Rouge  the  next  day  he  out- 
lined to  the  war  department  the  policy  which  he  should  pursue 
unless  he  was  otherwise  instructed.  Assuming  apparently  — 
for  as  yet  he  had  no  evidence  of  the  fact  —  that  the  Mexicans 
were  in  alliance  with  the  Indians,  he  said  that  he  should  deem 
it  his  duty  to  take  the  offensive,  if  they  showed  any  disposition 
to  menace  the  frontier.49  From  Natchitoches,  on  April  5,  he  or- 
dered the  'post  commanders  of  western  Arkansas  at  Fort  Gib- 
son and  Fort  Towson  to  prevent  both  Texans  and  Mexicans 
from  crossing  the  boundary  in  arms,  and  to  keep  United  States 
Indians  from  joining  in  the  Texan  disturbance.50  On  the  eighth, 
he  wrote  the  secretary  that  he  was  convinced  that  several  tribes 
of  United  States  Indians  had  crossed  the  Texan  boundary ;  that 
Santa  Anna  was  said  to  be  approaching  rapidly  through  the  cen- 
ter of  Texas,  determined  to  exterminate  all  who  refused  to  yield 
to  his  dictation;  and  that  it  was  reported  that  these  Indians 
would  unite  with  him  as  soon  as  he  reached  the  Trinity.  He 
thought  it  his  duty,  therefore,  "to  prepare  for  action,"  and  had 
asked  the  governors  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  and  Tennessee 
for  a  brigade,  and  the  governor  of  Alabama  for  a  battalion  of 
volunteers.51  At  the  same  time  he  ordered  from  Fort  Gibson 
six  or  eight  companies  of  the  Seventh  Infantry  for  service  be- 

48  Gaines  to  Jones,  February  6,  1838,,  manuscript  in  war  department. 

4825  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  351,  p.  768.  The  treaty 
of  1831  mutually  pledged  the  United  States  and  Mexico  to  maintain  peace  among 
the  border  Indians  under  their  respective  jurisdictions  (W.  M.  Malloy,  Treaties,  Con- 
ventions, International  Acts,  Protocals,  and  Agreements  between  the  United  States 
and  Other  Powers  [Washington,  1910],  1:  1095.),  and  it  was  not  a  new  doctrine 
in  the  United  States  that  in  case  of  the  inability  or  unwillingness  of  Mexico  to 
carry  out  the  treaty,  the  United  States  would,  in  self-defense,  be  justified  in 
crossing  the  boundary  to  restrain  the  Indians.  President  Monroe  had  given  substan- 
tially this  interpretation  to  a  similar  provision  in  the  Spanish  treaty  of  1795.  Richard- 
eon,  Messages  and  Papers,  2:30. 

so  Gaines  to  Arbuckle  and  Vose,  Letter  Book  of  Western  Department,  7 :  298,  in 
adjutant  general's  office. 

BI  Ibid.,  323 ;  25  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  351,  pp.  769,  770. 


18  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v.  H.  K. 

tween  Fort  Towson  and  Fort  Jessup,  where  for  a  short  time  he 
established  his  headquarters.52 

A  glance  at  conditions  in  Texas  will  help  to  explain  the  rumors 
of  Indian  activities  which  so  much  alarmed  General  Gaines. 
After  destroying  the  garrison  of  the  Alamo  on  March  6,  Santa 
Anna  had  begun  his  advance  across  the  heart  of  the  settlements, 
with  Houston  retreating  before  him;  on  March  19,  Fannin  sur- 
rendered to  General  Urrea,  and  a  week  later  was  massacred 
with  more  than  three  hundred  of  his  men;  and,  on  April  13, 
Santa  Anna,  leaving  Houston  in  his  rear,  crossed  the  Brazos 
and  made  a  dash  for  Harrisburg  which  President  Burnet  had 
chosen  for  a  temporary  capital.  Burning  the  town,  which  he 
found  deserted,  he  pursued  the  fleeing  government  until  stopped 
by  the  waters  of  Galveston  Bay,  and  was  returning  westward  to 
unite  with  his  main  division  when  Houston  encountered  him  at 
the  San  Jacinto  and  won  the  celebrated  battle  of  that  name  on 
April  21.  Santa  Anna's  advance  and  Houston's  retreat  had 
been  the  signal  for  a  panic  stricken  exodus  from  the  most  thickly 
settled  portion  of  Texas;  and  many  believed  that  Santa  Anna 
was  in  a  fair  way  to  make  good  his  alleged 53  threat  of  sweeping 
every  Anglo-American  beyond  the  Sabirie. 

Naturally  the  desirability  of  active  intervention  of  the  United 
States  did  not  escape  the  Texans;  and  it  seems  evident  that 
alarming  reports  of  warlike  Indian  movements  were  deliberate- 
ly manufactured,  or  at  the  least  greatly  exaggerated,  for  the 
purpose  of  bringing  this  about.  Sam  P.  Carson,  the  Texan 
secretary  of  state,  wrote  President  Burnet  from  Natchitoches, 
on  April  14,  that  General  Gaines  had  ordered  thirteen  compa- 
nies to  the  east  bank  of  the  Sabine,  and  that  he  would  consider , 
it  his  duty  to  take  the  aggressive  if  he  found  that  the  Mexicans 
had  incited  Indians  under  the  control  of  the  United  States  to 

52  25  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  351,  p.  289. 

&3  I  say  "alleged  threat"  because  I  have  never  seen  satisfactory  evidence  that 
Santa  Anna  had  formed  or  announced  such  drastic  intentions;  while  there  is,  in 
fact,  pretty  good  evidence  to  the  contrary  in  a  long  letter  from  Santa  Anna  to  the 
secretary  of  war,  Tornel,  February  16,  1836,  asking  for  instructions  concerning  the 
policy  which  he  should  pursue  after  the  rebellion  in  Texas  was  crushed.  He  sug- 
gested that  the  colonists,  as  the  aggressors,  should  pay  the  cost  of  the  war  and 
asked  whether  those  who  participated  in  the  rebellion  should  be  driven  from  the 
republic,  sent  into  the  interior,  or  left  where  they  Were.  University  of  Texas  tran- 
scripts from  Mexican  war  department. 


vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  19 

commit  depredations  on  either  side  of  the  boundary.  The  fact 
was,  he  said,  that  Caddo,  Cherokee,  and  other  Indians  of  the 
United  States,  were  already  with  the  Mexicans,  and  Gaines  had 
only  to  be  assured  of  this  to  act  "with  energy  and  efficiency/' 
"The  proof s,"  he  added,  "will,  I  have  no  doubt,  be  abundant 
by  the  time  he  reaches  the  Sabine. ' ' 54 

This  confidence  was  justified.  Citizens  of  Nacogdoches  and 
San  Augustine,  near  the  Louisiana  line,  had  been  busily  spread- 
ing an  Indian  scare  to  the  eastward  before  General  Gaines  ar- 
rived; and  it  was  upon  evidence  provided  by  them  that  he  ad- 
vanced to  the  Sabine.55  In  the  meantime,  however,  he  had  de- 
tailed Lieutenant  Joseph  Bonnell  of  the  Third  Infantry  to  in- 
vestigate the  Indian  situation;  and,  while  that  officer's  report 
on  April  20  showed  that  one  Manuel  Flores  had  been  trying  to 
incite  the  Caddo  to  war  on  the  Texans,  there  seemed  no  imme- 
diate necessity  for  a  further  advance  of  United  States  forces. 
On  the  twenty-eighth,  Gaines  received  reliable  reports  of  the 
battle  of  San  Jacinto ;  and  at  the  same  time  he  learned  that  the 
"Cherokees  and  other  Indians  in  Texas  from  our  side  of  the 
national  boundary  line,  are  disposed  to  return  to  their  villages, 
plant  corn  and  be  peaceable"56  He  withdrew,  therefore,  his 
requisition  upon  the  governors  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi,  Ala- 
bama, and  Tennessee  for  reinforcements,  sent  to  the  command- 
ers of  the  Mexican  and  the  Texan  armies  an  offer  of  friendly 
mediation,  and  ordered  Captain  Hitchcock  to  Washington  to 
supply  the  government  with  information  that  might  be  helpful 
in  case,  as  seemed  certain,  the  Texans  should  apply  for  annexa- 
tion to  the  United  States.57  By  June  7,  he  had  reason  to  doubt 
that  the  capture  of  Santa  Anna  would  cause  Mexico  to  recognize 
Texan  independence:  "The  Indians  may,  therefore,  again  be 
required  to  act  against  the  inhabitants  residing  in  the  disputed 
territory  —  [between  the  Sabine  and  the  Neches] . ' »  Reenf  orce- 
ments  might  still  be  needed,  and  he  had  notified  Governor  Can- 
non to  hold  the  Tennessee  brigade  ready  for  action.  Toward 

5-*  Manuscript  in  Texas  State  Library.  Extracts  of  the  letter  are  printed  in 
Texas  State  Historical  Association,  Quarterly,  4 :  253,  254. 

55  Gaines  to  Cass,  April  20,  1836,  25  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Docu- 
ment 351,  p.  771,  with  inclosures,  773-783. 

56  Hid.,  783. 

57  Hid.,  782,  784,  786. 


20  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v.  H.  B. 

the  end  of  June,  he  was  informed  that  Indians  — ' i  suspected  to 
have  been  Caddoes"  —  had  committed  depredations  in  Robert- 
son's colony  in  the  interior  of  Texas,  and  this,  in  connection 
with  the  report  that  General  Urrea  was  leading  a  large  force 
to  renew  the  war  in  Texas,  caused  him  to  order  a  detachment 
to  Nacogdoches.  On  July  10,  he  instructed  "the  officer  com- 
manding the  United  States  troops  at  or  near  Nacogdoches  near 
Texas "  to  restrain  by  force  any  Indians  from  acts  of  hostility 
1  i  against  the  United  States  troops  or  against  any  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  this  frontier,  or  the  disputed  territory  to  the  South  or 
East  or  North  of  Nacogdoches."  But  at  the  same  time  he 
warned  that  officer  that  the  hostility  of  the  Indians  should  be 
"demonstrated  ~by  their  conduct  rather  than  by  their  threats." 
A  copy  of  this  order  was  forwarded  to  the  secretary,  and  was 
received  at  the  war  department  on  August  5.58  Whether  this 
force  immediately  occupied  Nacogdoches  is  not  disclosed  by  the 
records  of  the  war  department;  but  on  July  31  three  troops  of 
dragoons  and  six  companies  of  the  Seventh  Infantry  arrived 
there  from  Fort  Towson.59  These  troops  remained  at  Nacog- 
doches until  December  19.60 

The  strict  letter  of  his  instructions  gave  General  Gaines  au- 
thority for  this  movement,  but  their  spirit  enjoined  a  greater 
degree  of  critical  judgment  than  he  was  capable  of  exercising. 
On  April  25,  in  answer  to  his  letter  of  March  29,  General  Cass 
/wrote  him  that  if  the  approach  of  the  contending  parties  or  the 
(excitement  of  the  Indians  jeopardized  the  lives  and  property  of 
jour  citizens  on  the  frontier,  he  might  take  up  a  defensive  posi- 
tion on  either  side  of  the  boundary  line,  but  under  no  circum- 
stances was  he  to  advance  beyond  Nacogdoches,  which  was 
I"  within  the  limits  of  the  United  States  as  claimed  by  this  Gov- 
ernment." On  May  4,  Cass  wrote  him  that  much  must  be  left 
to  his  discretion,  on  account  of  the  distance  from  the  seat  of  gov- 
ernment, and  reminded  him  that  his  objects  were  the  protection 
of  the  frontier,  and  "as  strict  a  performance  of  the  neutral 
duties  of  the  United  States  as  the  great  object  of  self  defense 

ss  Manuscript  in  war  department.     See  also  Gaines  to  Cass,  June  28,  1836,  Letter 
Book  of  Western  Department,  7:   340. 

59  25  Congress,   2  Session,  House  Executive   Document   351,  p.   788 ;    Lieutenant 
Colonel  William  Whistler,  August  4,   1836,  manuscript  in  war  department. 

60  Report  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Whistler,  manuscript  in  war  department. 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  21 

.  -.--<•• 
will  permit.    You  will  take  care  and  do  no  act  which  can  give 

just  cause  of  offence  to  any  other  government;  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  you  will  not  permit  the  frontiers  to  be  invaded  by  any 
forces  whatever. "  A  week  later  (May  12)  Cass  repeated  this 
statement  and  added  that,  if  Indians  were  not  employed  imme- 
diately on  the  border,  there  would  be  no  need  to  advance  "be- 
yond the  territory  heretofore  in  the  actual  occupation  of  the 
United  States.  ...  I  must  impress  upon  you  the  desire  of  the 
President  that  you  do  not  advance  unless  circumstances  distinct- 
ly show  this  step  is  necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  district 
of  our  country  adjoining  the  scene  of  operations  in  Texas. " 
On  August  5,  President  Jackson  refused  to  confirm  Gaines 's  call 
of  June  28  for  a  brigade  from  Tennessee,  saying  that  the  evi- 
dence submitted  failed  to  show  the  necessity  for  it,  and  that  the 
well  known  disposition  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  to 
befriend  Texas  made  it  necessary  for  the  government  to  be  ex- 
tremely careful  to  avoid  any  reasonable  suspicion  of  overstep- 
ping its  neutral  obligations.  Finally,  on  September  4,  the  pres- 
ident himself  wrote  Gaines :  The  policy  of  the  United  States 
was  one  of  strict  neutrality,  and  Gaines  as  commander  of  our 
forces  on  the  frontier  "must  religiously  observe  and  maintain 
it. ' '  By  treaty  Mexico  was  under  obligation  to  prevent  the  In- 
dians in  its  territory  from  warring  on  our  citizens;  and,  if  it 
was  unable  or  unwilling  to  do  this,  international  law  and  self- 
defense  would  justify  the  United  States  in  doing  it.  To  this 
end  Gaines  should  take  the  position  most  favorable  to  the  secur- 
ity of  the  frontier  and  pursue  such  Indians  wherever  he  found 
them,  regardless  of  the  boundary  line ;  but  he  must  be  very  care- 
ful "not  to  be  deceived  by  the  evidence  on  which  so  responsible 
an  act  is  to  be  justified.  Unless  the  necessity  exists,  unless  there 
are  actual  disturbances  of  the  peace  of  the  frontier,  or  a  moral 
certainty  that  the  Indians  are  in  hostile  array  for  the  purpose 
and  are  drawing  the  means  of  operation  from  the  territory  of 
Mexico,  the  occupation  of  an  advanced  post  in  that  territory,  by 
our  troops,  must  be  avoided/'  Just  as  he  finished  this  letter, 
President  Jackson  received  from  the  war  department  a  letter 
from  Gaines  of  July  21,  with  inclosures,  wjiich  seemed  to  leave 
no  doubt  that  the  Mexicans  were  inciting  the  Indians ;  and  he  au- 
thorized him,  if  he  found  the  statements  true,  to  march  to  Na- 


22  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v.  H.  E. 

cogdoches  with  his  whole  force ;  but  he  was  to  keep  ever  in  view 
"our  neutral  position  in  reference  to  the  civil  war  in  Texas,  and 
our  treaty  obligations  in  reference  to  the  authorities  of  Mex- 
ico. "61 

In  the  meantime,  General  Gaines 's  movements  had  been  a 
subject  of  prolific  correspondence  between  Gorostiza  and  the 
state  department.  On  April  20,  Forsyth  in  a  personal  confer- 
ence informed  Gorostiza  that  Gaines  would  take  a  position  to  en- 
able him  to  protect  both  Mexico  and  the  United  States  from 
Indians  and  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  as  well,  from 
violation  by  Mexicans  and  Texans.  If,  in  the  accomplishment 
of  this  end,  his  troops  advanced  beyond  the  line  that  Mexico 
might  suppose  to  be  the  limits  of  the  United  States,  Mexico 
should  not  consider  it  an  indication  of  hostile  feeling,  or  of  a 
desire  to  claim  territory  that  the  boundary  treaty  denied  us. 
"The  occupation  would  be  precautional  and  provisional,  and 
would  be  abandoned  whenever  .  .  .  the  disturbances  in  that 
region  should  cease. "  To  this  Gorostiza  replied  formally  the 
next  day  saying  that  it  was  perfectly  reasonable  for  the  United 
States  to  wish  to  preserve  its  territory  from  violation,  and 
Mexico  could  of  course  offer  no  objection  so  long  as  General 
Gaines  remained  within ' l  the  known  limits  of  the  United  States. " 
Territory  long  occupied  by  Mexico,  however,  should  be  regarded 
as  Mexican  territory  until  the  boundary  survey  adjudged  it  to 
the  United  States ;  and  in  the  meantime  the  United  States  should 
keep  its  hands  off.  At  the  same  time  he  expressed  the  hope 
that  General  Gaines  would  be  instructed  to  ' '  oppose  the  entrance 
into  Texas  of  any  American  citizen,  who  may  attempt  to  pass 
the  frontier  armed,  or  as  a  colonist,  for  the  purpose  of  joining 
the  ranks  of  the  rebels."  Forsyth  answered  this  on  the  twen- 
ty-sixth by  saying  that  Gaines  had  not  been  ordered  to  take  a 
position  in  the  disputed  territory,  and  that  it  was  hoped  that  he 
would  not  find  it  necessary  to  do  so ;  but,  upon  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  take  such  a  position  in  self-defense,  Forsyth 
was  unyielding.  Gorostiza  was  firmly  convinced  that  the  object 

6i  Cass's  instructions  of  April  25  and  May  4  and  12  are  in  24  Congress,  1  Session, 
House  Executive  Document  256,  pp.  45,  48,  54;  Jackson's  letter  to  Governor 
Cannon  in  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate  Document  1,  pp.  60-62;  and  Jackson's  let- 
ters to  Gaines  in  the  manuscripts  of  war  department. 


Vol.  I,  No.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  23 

of  the  movement  would  be  to  favor  the  Texans,  and  he  wrote 
his  government  that  he  intended  to  ask  for  his  passports  and 
terminate  his  mission  whenever  he  learned  that  Gaines  had 
crossed  the  Sabine.62  Forsyth  pretended  to  believe  that  Goros- 
tiza's  opposition  rested  solely  on  his  fear  that  the  occupation 
of  an  advanced  position  would  be  used  by  the  United  States  to 
prejudice  in  its  favor  the  boundary  survey,  and  several  times 
aroused  the  latter 's  indignation  by  assuring  him  that  such  was 
not  the  intention  of  the  government,  and  that  he  ought  therefore 
to  be  content. 

On  May  9,  Gorostiza  learned  of  Gaines 's  instructions  to  ad- 
vance at  his  discretion  as  far  as  Nacogdoches;  and,  from  then 
until  October  15,  when  he  abandoned  his  mission  in  disgust,  the 
burden  of  his  correspondence  with  the  state  department  was 
one  question:  "Has  Gaines  crossed  the  Sabine ?"  On  Au- 
gust 4  and  23,  the  state  department  told  him  that  the  govern- 
ment had  no  information  that  any  portion  of  Gaines 's  force  had 
crossed  that  river.63  September  23,  Forsyth  informed  him 
that,  although  the  government  had  no  official  report  on  the  sub- 
ject, it  appeared  from  certain  letters  addressed  to  Gaines  by 
Lieutenant  Bonnell  on  August  9  that  some  of  the  troops  were 
at  Nacogdoches ;  and  on  October  13  the  acting  secretary  of  state, 

62  25  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  190,  pp.  74-79. 

63  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  war  department  had  received  on  August  5  Gaines 's 
order  of  July  10  to  "the  Officer  commanding  the  United  States  troops  at  or  near 
Nacogdoches,  near     Texas"    (ante,  20),  this  statement   may  be   regarded  as  skirt- 
ing pretty  closely  the  margin  of  veracity.       Nevertheless,  it  was  technically  true, 
and  Gorostiza  himself,  who  had  read  in  a  newspaper  as  early  as  August  18  a  copy 
of  this  order,  wrote  his  own  government  that  he  had  no  means  of  knowing  whether 
that  officer  had  marched  as  directed:     ''The  newspapers   are  again  silent,  private 
letters  give  no  assurances  on  the  affair,  which  is  so  completely  wrapped  in  mystery 
that  I  am  myself  much  puzzled  with  regard  to  it."     (25  Congress,  2  Session,  House 
Executive  Document  190,  p.  97.)     Even  the  alert  and  intelligent  Mexican  consul  at 
New  Orleans,  much  nearer  the  scene  of  operations,  was  in  a  similar  state  of  uncer- 
tainty.    August   29,   he  wrote   Gorostiza  that  a  friend  at  Natchitoches  had  written 
him  on  August  20  saying  that  there  were  240  infantry  and  100  cavalry  at  Nacog- 
doches, where  they  were  raising  a  fort;   but  on  September   3  he  wrote  that  he  had 
just  conversed  with  a  friend  who  came  from  Gaines 's  camp,  and  this  person  assured 
him  that  Gaines  had  never  crossed  the  Sabine  or  left  his  camp  on  the  east  bank  of 
the  river;  and  he  gave  more  credence  to  this  than  to  the  former  report.     (University 
of  Texas  Transcripts  from  Mexican  foreign  office.)     As  a  matter  of  fact  both  re- 
ports were  true :     the  troops  were  at  Nacogdoches,  and,  so  far  as  the  evidence  shows, 
Gaines  personally  did  not  cross  the  Sabine. 


24  E.  C.  Barker  M.  v.  H.  K. 

Asbury  Dickens,  told  him  that  the  war  department  had  infor- 
mation that  they  were  still  there  on  September  4,  but  whether 
they  had  since  retired  the  government  was  uninformed.  At  the 
same  time,  Dickens  told  him  that  the  president  declined  to  re- 
call the  discretionary  instructions  given  to  General  Gaines,  be- 
lieving them  necessary  to  the  proper  protection  of  the  frontier. 
To  this  Gorostiza  replied  on  the  fifteenth,  demanding  pass- 
ports. The  danger  of  Indian  attacks  on  the  frontier  of  the 
United  States,  he  declared,  had  existed  only  in  the  imagination 
of  the  Texans  and  of  persons  hostile  to  Mexico :  so  long  as  the 
colonists  were  submissive  to  the  laws  of  Mexico,  nothing  was 
heard  of  the  hostile  designs  of  the  Indians,  although  since  1832 
Mexico  had  had  no  garrison  at  Nacogdoches  or  anywhere  near 
the  frontier ;  they  were  still  quiet  during  the  early  period  of  the 
revolution,  while  the  colonists  were  successful;  and  not  until 
March,  1836,  when  it  seemed  that  the  victorious  Mexican  army 
would  soon  reach  the  Sabine,  did  reports  of  Indian  hostility 
begin  to  spread ;  after  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto,  with  the  disap- 
pearance of  the  danger  that  had  threatened  the  Texans,  the  In- 
dians "also  disappeared  in  consequence, "  and  Gaines  withdrew 
his  call  for  volunteers;  but,  about  the  end  of  June,  it  became 
known  that  Mexico  was  preparing  for  a  new  campaign,  and 
"immediately,  as  if  by  enchantment,  the  hostile  Indians  again 
appeared ";  Gaines 's  partiality  for  the  Texans  was  notorious, 
and  his  credulity  had  been  so  great  that  his  ' '  statements  should 
have  had  no  weight  with  one  so  enlightened  as  the  President  of 
the  United  States. "  64 

It  seems  beyond  dispute  that  General  Gaines  was  over-credu- 
lous and  that  he  exaggerated  the  danger  of  an  Indian  uprising. 
General  Alexander  Macomb  wrote  from  New  Orleans,  April  25, 
1836,  that  Governor  White  of  Louisiana  believed  that  Gaines  was 
deceived  by  persons  interested  in  Texan  speculations ; 65  and  the 
fact  that  General  John  T.  Mason  was  one  of  those  who  urged 
him  to  occupy  Nacogdoches  lends  color  to  this  suspicion.  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Whistler,  who  commanded  at  Nacogdoches,  wrote 

e*  This  correspondence  is  in  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate  Document  1,  pp.  47, 
53,  84,  94,  101.  Bonnell  to  Gaines,  August  9,  1836,  is  in  25  Congress,  2  Session, 
House  Executive  Document  351,  p.  799. 

°5  24  Congress,  1  Session,  House  Executive  Document  256,  p.  55. 


Vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  25 

the  war  department  on  September  4  that  there  had  never  been 
any  disposition  on  the  part  of  the  adjacent  tribes  to  attack  our 
frontier,  and  that  whatever  intention  they  may  have  had  to  at- 
tack the  Texans  had  been  removed  by  the  presence  of  the  United 
States  forces.  In  a  later  communication  (October  13)  he  com- 
plained that  his  command  had  suffered  the  hardships  of  a  march 
of  nearly  four  hundred  miles  '  '  to  afford  protection  to  a  foreign 
state. ' ' 66  Lieutenant  Bonnell  gathered  some  ridiculous  hear- 
say evidence  to  the  effect  that  Manuel  Flores  was  trying  to  agi- 
tate the  Indians  and  that  he  claimed  to  represent  the  Mexican 
government;  but  while  this  tended  to  establish  Flores'  char- 
acter as  an  ugly  tempered  braggart,  it  seems  hardly  entitled  to 
serious  consideration  in  the  charge  against  Mexico.  Moreover, 
there  is  a  little  positive  evidence  to  refute  the  charge:  Santa 
Anna,  writing  the  Mexican  war  department  on  February  16  for 
instructions  concerning  the  policy  which  he  should  follow  in 
Texas,  asked,  "What  of  the  Indians ?"  The  Cherokee  had  done 
good  service  to  the  nation  in  1827 ;  and  he  understood  that  they 
had  been  promised  a  grant  of  land  which  they  had  never  ob- 
tained; should  they  be  left  without  any  further  guarantee, 
"thereby  exposing  ourselves  to  their  hostility ";  or  should  they 
be  ordered  from  the  country!  67  This  question  is  not  to  be  rec- 
onciled with  a  settled  policy  of  alliance  with  the  Indians  against 
the  colonists.68  In  fairness  to  Gaines,  however,  it  should  be  re- 

66  Manuscript  in  war  department.     See  also  Hitchcock,  Fifty  Years  in  Camp  and 
Field,  98,  cited  in  G.  L.  Rives,  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848  (New  York, 
1913),  1:  375.     For  General  Mason's  interest  in  Texan  lands  see  by  the  writer  "Land 
Speculation  as  a  Cause  of  the  Texas  Revolution, "  in  Texas  State  Historical  Associa- 
tion, Quarterly,  10:  76-95. 

67  University  of  Texas  transcripts  from  Mexican  war  department. 

68  The  colonists,  on  the  other  hand,  had  deliberately  contemplated  an  alliance  with 
the  Cherokee.     On  December  26,  1835,  the  general  council  of  the  provisional  govern- 
ment asked  Governor   Smith  to  commission   Sam  Houston,  John  Forbes,   and   John 
Cameron  to  treat  with  the  Cherokee  and  to  secure,  among  other  things,  ' '  the  effective 
cooperation  of  the  Indians,  at  a  time  when  it  may  be  necessary  to  call  all  the  effective 
force  of  Texas  into  the  field,  and  agreeing  for  their  service  in  a  body  for  a  specified 
time."     (Journal  of  the   General  Council,  208.)     On   February   23,    1836,   Houston 
and  Forbes  did  sign  a  treaty  of  friendship  with  the  Cherokee,  but  it  made  no  pro- 
vision for  an  alliance.     Sam  P.  Carson,  writing  to  President  Burnet,  April  14,  1836, 
said :     ' ( You  will  perceive  that  we  cannot  use  Indian  auxiliaries  unless  in  self  defence. 
The  Treaty  referred  to  [that  of  1831  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico]  requires 
the  United  States  to  put  such  conduct  down. ' '     Garrison,  Diplomatic  Correspondence 
of  Texas,  1 :  83. 


26  E.  C.  Barker  M-  v-  H.  E. 

membered,  as  he  himself  reminded  General  Cass,  that  he  had 
seen  much  suffering  through  the  failure  of  the  government  to 
act  vigorously  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities,  before  the  Indians 
started  their  career  of  killing  and  burning.  As  he  said,  he  be- 
lieved in  "protection  to  the  living  citizen,  rather  than  to  the 
ashes  of  the  slain. " 69  While  his  sympathy  for  the  Texans 
caused  him  to  exaggerate  the  danger,  it  seems  to  the  writer  that 
he  was  sincere  in  his  belief  that  it  did  exist,  and  that  his  con- 
scious purpose  was  solely  to  protect  the  frontier  of  the  United 
States  from  a  devastating  Indian  war. 

The  sweeping  charge  that  Gaines 's  men  won  the  battle  of  San 
Jacinto  70  demands  a  glance  at  the  subject  of  desertions.  That 
the  subject  early  became  a  serious  one  is  indicated  by  an  order 
of  May  1,  1836 : 71  to  guard  meritorious  soldiers  against  being 
deceived,  they  are  "notified  that  arrangements  will  be  made  in 
a  few  days  to  obtain  from  the  proper  authorities  in  Texas  all 
deserters  now  there,  and  those  that  attempt  hereafter  to  desert 
thither;  and  they  are  hereby  assured  that  they  shall  be  punished 
with  the  greatest  possible  severity  the  law  and  the  courts  will 
allow."  At  about  this  same  time,  General  Gaines  sent  Lieuten- 
ant Nute  into  Texas  with  four  men  to  arrest  deserters;  and  Nute 
advanced  as  far  as  Victoria,  where  he  found  the  Texan  army 
and  probably  was  instrumental  in  causing  General  Eusk  to  issue 
an  order  warning  all  recruiting  officers  against  enlisting  de- 
serters, and  ordering  commanding  officers  to  hold  deserters  al- 
ready enlisted  subject  to  identification  and  delivery  to  the  Unit- 
ed States.72  In  August,  Lieutenant  Griffin  was  at  Velasco  on 
a  similar  mission ; 73  and  General  Order  No.  41,  issued  Septem- 
ber 26,  offered  a  pardon  to  all  who  returned  before  October 
20.74  The  records  of  courts  martial  at  Nacogdoches  and  Camp 
Sabine  show  a  good  many  trials  for  desertion  —  usually  several 

69  25  Congress,  2  Session,  House  Executive  Document  351,  pp.  773,  787. 

70  Jackson  to  Gaines,  September   4,,   1836,  manuscript   in   war  department. 

71  Order  Book  of  Western  Department,  10 :   22,  manuscript  in   war  department. 
7(2  Gaines  published  Busk's  order  on  July  2   (Orders  and  Special  Orders,  1836-7, 

vol.  275),  and  reported  Nute's  mission  to  the  secretary  on  July  14.  (Manuscript  in 
war  department.)  Rusk's  order  was  dated  June  10. 

73  Morfit  to  Forsyth,  August  23,  1836.  Texas  Despatches,  1836-1842,  manuscript 
in  state  department.  Morfit 's  letter  is  printed  in  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate 
Document  20,  p.  20,  but  this  reference  to  deserters  is  there  omitted. 

™  Orders   and  General  Orders,  1836-7,  as  cited  above. 


Vol.  I,  No.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  27 

at  each  session  of  the  court  —  but  there  is  no  evidence  of  whole- 
sale desertions.  The  proximity  of  the  border,  the  liberal  land 
bounties  offered  by  Texas,  and  the  promise  of  active  war  must 
have  presented  to  the  average  private  a  temptation  hard  to 
resist. 

In  the  meantime,  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  toward 
recognizing  the  independence  of  Texas  had  been  a  subject  of 
protest  by  Gorostiza.  He  wrote  his  government,  on  April  25, 
that  a  member  of  Congress  had  just  assured  him  with  great 
secrecy  that  a  proposal  was  going  to  be  made  in  Congress  for 
recognition.  Gorostiza  thought  that  the  move  was  premature, 
but  that  it  would  pass  if  the  southern  members  urged  it.  His 
policy  would  be  to  fight  inch  by  inch  and,  if  the  measure  passed, 
to  ask  for  passports  and  leave.75  The  next  day,  the  subject  was 
brought  before  the  senate  by  Senator  Morris  of  Ohio,  who  pre- 
sented a  memorial  from  people  of  his  state  suggesting  recogni- 
tion. He  moved  its  reference  to  the  committee  on  foreign  rela- 
tions; but  there  was  some  opposition,  especially  by  King  of 
Alabama;  and  Morris  consented  to  table  the  petition  to  await 
similar  expressions  from  other  states.  In  the  house,  Williams 
of  Kentucky  asked  consent  on  the  twenty-ninth  to  offer  a  reso- 
lution instructing  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs  to  enquire 
into  the  expediency  and  propriety  of  acknowledging  independ- 
ence ;  but  the  house  refused  to  suspend  the  rules  to  receive  the 
resolution.76  As  had  been  expected,  other  popular  expressions 
favoring  recognition  came  to  the  senate ;  and,  on  May  23,  these 
were,  on  motion  of  Walker  of  Mississippi,  referred  to  the  com- 
mittee on  foreign  relations,  of  which  Clay  was  chairman.77  Gor- 
ostiza protested  vigorously  against  this.  There  was  nothing 
upon  which  to  base  recognition,  he  said,  except  a  rumor  of  the 
battle  of  San  Jacinto ;  and,  assuming  that  this  were  as  reported, 
there  were  other  generals  in  Texas  to  prosecute  the  war;  and 
even  if  these  should  "so  far  lose  their  senses  as  to  yield  to  en- 

75  University  of  Texas  transcripts  from  Mexican  foreign  office.  For  the  Texan 
overtures  to  the  United  States  for  recognition,  see  Garrison,  "First  Stage  of  the 
Movement  for  the  Annexation  of  Texas,"  in  American  Historical  Revieiv,  10:  72-75, 
and  Rather,  * '  Recognition  of  the  Republic  of  Texas  by  the  United  States, ' '  in  Texas 
State  Historical  Association,  Quarterly,  13:  155-256. 

W  Congressional  Globe,  3:  331,  338. 

TT  Ibid.,  393-395. 


28  E.  C.  Barker  M.  v.  H.  B. 

emies  who  could  not  attack  them,  could  not  Mexico,  with  its 
seven  million,  find  men  to  oppose  Houston's  six  hundred ?" 
Forsyth  replied  that  the  president  must  presume  that  Congress 
would  take  no  action  that  was  not  right  and  just,  and  that  in  any 
case  it  would  not  be  proper  to  discuss  such  action  before  Con- 
gress itself  reached  a  decision.  The  president  wished  him  to 
be  assured,  however,  that  the  United  States  would  take  no  step 
inconsistent  with  its  attitude  during  the  contest  between  Spain 
and  its  late  American  colonies,  including  Mexico.78 

On  June  18,  Clay  brought  in  a  report  that  the  independence 
of  Texas  ought  to  be  recognized  whenever  it  furnished  satis- 
factory information  that  it  had  an  organized  government  cap- 
able of  performing  the  obligations  of  an  independent  power. 
This  passed  unanimously  on  July  1,  with  an  amendment  author- 
izing the  president  to  send  a  confidential  agent  to  Texas  to  as- 
certain the  true  status  of  the  country.  The  house  passed  the 
senate  resolution  on  July  4.  Preston,  in  the  meantime,  had 
called  on  the  president  for  any  correspondence  that  he  might 
have  had,  with  the  Texan  authorities,  in  the  hope  that  this  might 
furnish  a  basis  for  immediate  action ;  but  the  president  replied 
that  he  had  had  no  such  correspondence,  and  could  have  none 
before  recognition.  He  added  that  he  had  already  sent  to  Texas 
a  confidential  agent  to  report  the  condition  of  that  country.79 

Preston's  action  aroused  Gorostiza,  who  wrote  home  that  the 
purpose  in  calling  for  correspondence  had  been  to  stir  up  ex- 
citement and  secure  recognition,  after  an  impassioned  discus- 
sion, by  a  headlong  vote  [votacion  tumultuosa].  The  presi- 
dent's reply  that  he  had  no  correspondence  was  to  be  expected 
because  otherwise  he  would  have  had  to  admit  clandestine  rela- 
tions with  the  rebels,  contrary  to  his  obligations  to  Mexico; 
and  the  "singular  morality  of  the  American  government  is  to 
figure  precisely  on  always  saving  appearances."  Nevertheless, 
this  simple  answer  had  completely  ruined  Preston's  plan,  be- 
cause it  was  impossible  to  vote  immediate  recognition  in  the 
face  of  the  government's  plain  statement  that  it  knew  nothing 
of  the  Texan  government  but  had  taken  steps  to  inform  itself.80 

78  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate  Document  1,  pp.  32-34. 

79  Congressional  Glole,  3 :  453,  479,  486. 

so  Gorostiza  to  minister  of  relaciones,  July  6,  1836,  University  of  Texas  transcripts 
from  Mexican  foreign  office. 


vol.  i,  NO.  i  The  United  States  and  Mexico  29 

A  few  days  after  this  (July  9),  Gorostiza  heard  that  two  Texan 
commissioners  would  soon  arrive  in  Washington  with  a  copy  of 
the  treaty  of  Velasco,  in  which  Santa  Anna  had  recognized  the 
independence  of  Texas ;  and,  in  order  that  the  United  States  gov- 
ernment might  not  attach  too  much  importance  to  this  document, 
he  notified  Forsyth  that  his  government  considered  all  of  Santa 
Anna's  acts,  while  a  prisoner,  null  and  void.81  This,  he  wrote, 
would  prevent  action  for  the  present ;  but  Austin,  who  had  gone 
to  Texas  in  June  with  confidential  instructions  to  the  ad  interim 
government,  would  probably  soon  return;  and  the  president 
would  then  decide  whether  to  throw  off  the  mask.82  His  sus- 
picions of  Austin's  mission,  however,  were  unfounded.  Austin 
felt  keenly  the  neglect  of  the  Texan  government  in  failing  to 
keep  him  and  his  colleagues  informed  of  local  conditions,  and 
believed  that  this  had  prevented  recognition  in  May.83  He  may 
have  returned  to  Texas  determined  to  change  this  policy,  but 
he  had  no  understanding  with  Jackson.  In  fact,  the  agent  whom 
the  president  did  send  to  Texas,  Henry  M.  Morfit,84  advised 
against  immediate  recognition ; 85  and,  in  his  messages  of  De- 
cember 5  and  21  to  Congress,  Jackson  recommended  delay.86 

Historians  will  hardly  agree  as  to  the  uprightness  of  our  gov- 
ernment in  its  attitude  toward  the  Texas-Mexican  question. 
My  own  opinion  is  that,  despite  President  Jackson's  desire  to 
acquire  Texas  and  his  probably  strong  conviction  that  Texan 
success  would  further  that  end,  the  administration  tried  in  a 
lukewarm  manner  to  meet  the  spirit  as  well  as  the  letter  of  its 
neutral  obligations.  That  there  were  violations  of  the  law,  how- 
ever, and  probably  with  the  connivance  of  local  federal  officers, 
cannot  be  doubted.  Was  this  official  laxness  due  to  the  belief 
that  it  would  not  seriously  offend  the  government,  or  to  the 
knowledge  that  judicial  convictions,  in  view  of  the  overwhelm- 

81  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate  Document  1,  pp.  36-38. 

82  Gorostiza  -to  minister  of  relaciones,  July  12,  1836,  University  of  Texas  tran- 
scripts from  Mexican  foreign  office. 

83  Austin   to    Burnet,    June    10,    1836.     Garrison,    Diplomatic   Correspondence    of 
Texas,  I:  98. 

84  Strangely  enough  both  Gorostiza  and   Martinez,  at   New  Orleans,  reported  to 
the  foreign  office  that  it  was  Poinsett  who  went  to  Texas  on  this  mission.     University 
of  Texas  transcripts,  from  Mexico  foreign  office. 

85  See  his  letters,  24  Congress,  2  Session,  Senate  Document  20. 
««  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers,  3 :  237,  238,  26-5-269. 


30  E.  C.  Barker  M.  v.  H.  E. 

ing  pro-Texan  sentiment,  would  be  impossible?  Probably  in 
some  degree  to  both.  But  in  any  case  one  cannot  but  regret  the 
want  of  more  serious  efforts  to  check,  by  arrest  and  prosecution, 
enlistments  and  organized  expeditions  from  the  United  States; 
the  failure  of  General  Gaines  to  exercise  a  little  more  cool  judg- 
ment and  hard  common  sense  in  carrying  out  his  discretionary 
authority  to  invade  Texas ;  and  the  refusal  of  our  state  depart- 
ment to  adopt  a  less  baffling  tone  of  curt  and  frigid  politeness  in 
its  correspondence  with  the  representatives  of  the  Mexican 
government.  And  in  any  case,  one  cannot  but  feel  the  justifiable- 
ness  of  Mexican  suspicion  and  resentment  against  the  United 
States. 

EUGENE  C.  BARKER 
UNIVERSITY  OF  TEXAS 
AUSTIN 


